Abstract: This paper documents the electoral advantage of candidates who have a newspaper endorsement published on Election Day compared to other endorsed candidates. I provide evidence that this advantage is not driven by a selection effect, suggesting that it is instead explained by readers deciding how to vote based on endorsements read on Election Day.
Introduction
During any election year, a sizable proportion of news media is dedicated to informing citizens about election issues. Before any election voters are offered numerous political viewpoints and newspapers' editorial comments on candidates. However, many American newspapers persist in repeating political endorsements on Election Day. Are they providing voter recommendations that will simply be ignored?
This paper provides evidence that the media advice provided on Election Day does matter in determining election results, and presents evidence regarding newspapers' political endorsements. Newspapers begin publishing recommendations one to two months before an election, allocating part of their editorial pages to their rationale for a particular endorsement.
As the date of the election approaches newspapers republish a summary list of their choices in which they provide a more succinct explanation of their selections in two or three lines; in many cases they only list the names of the candidates they endorse. This paper documents the Tuesday Advantage: candidates who have a newspaper endorsement published on Election Day have a higher vote share than other endorsed candidates. One explanation of this difference could be that such recommendations have no effect on election results and newspapers simply differ in their type of endorsements.
However, in this paper I show that this is not the case; rather, this correlation is explained by voters following newspapers' advice provided on Election Day. 2 The Tuesday Advantage is revealed in regressions through which I explain cross-county variation in endorsed candidates' vote share, including controls for poll results, race competitiveness, candidate, county, newspaper characteristics, and endorsement publication date. The confounding factor underlying a causal inference relies on a possible correlation between the merit of receiving a reendorsement on Election Day and the ability to receive votes. The suspected case is that newspapers decide to declare their support for "clear winners" on the Tuesday of the election, but a description of the data refutes this explanation. In fact, newspapers are less likely to endorse incumbents through Tuesday Endorsements. Aside fro m incumbency, other candidate and race characteristics do not predict these recommendations.
To provide more conclusive evidence of a causal effect, I performed two robustness checks. First, only voters in media markets who live in a jurisdiction where ne wspapers provide political coverage are expected to be guided by newspapers' political advice and by Tuesday Endorsements. Using the congruency concept developed by Snyder and Stromberg (2010) , I separated county jurisdiction according to degree of congrue ncy (or the match between newspaper markets and respective political jurisdiction This behavioural interpretation for the Tuesday Effect is in line with previous work.
Related to a financial setting, at least two papers find that the salience of information affects the way people make use of it. DellaVigna and Pollet (2009) find that investors underreact to new information issued on Fridays (close to the weekend). Huberman and Reveg (2001) find that investors pay more attention to information released in New York Times headlines than when the same facts are presented inside the same newspaper. This current study provides evidence that suggests that a similar phenomenon also determines media political influence on election results, which sheds light on voters' behaviour and contributes to the literature related to media effects. More specifically, this paper quantifies the effect of salience on media political influence and the effect of newspaper endorsements. In his framework he assumes that the value of a good V is determined by an opaque (o) and a visible (v) co mponent, as in V=o +v. Ho wever, due to inattention, a consumer perceives the value to be V= (1 -θ)o+v, where θ is the degree of inattention. In the context of this paper the opaque informat ion refers to endorsements published before Election Day. Th is assumption is in line with the intuition that Tuesday recommendations are more salient since they are provided on the day they are used.
5 There is a vast body of literature that shows a strong and positive association between votes and received endorsements, including Erickson (1976 ), Coo mbs (1981 ), Bu llock (1984 , Lieske (1989) , and Krebs (1998 Overall, these findings suggest that last-minute political endorsements have positive consequences within American local elections. Assuming that partisan papers only make cross-ideological endorsements when there is a difference in quality among candidates (large enough to compensate for their ideological preferences), the fact that readers recognize and are aware of media prejudices helps them make voting choices, granting votes to "higherquality" candidates.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section Two describes the data. Section Three provides a description of endorsed candidates' profiles. Section Four presents the regression results and documents the Tuesday Advantage. I discuss the results and present conclusions in Section 5. When gathering the data from online resources I searched for key words such as "election," "endorsement," or "recommendation. 
Data

Endorsement Timing and Candidates' Profiles
This paper aims to identify a causal effect of endorsements based on the comparison of vote shares across similar candidates (those who were endorsed). Nonetheless, the assumption of homogeneity across candidates is contestable. In order to rule out any selection effect, timing and endorsements would ideally be decided on randomly by newspapers. This is too much to expect from actual endorsements and indeed is not observed in the data.
However, I argue that the decision to publish an endorsement on Election Day is not positively correlated with candidates' vote share. As shown in Table 1 , Tuesday Endorsement candidates have only a slightly higher (and not statistically different) vote share, and win the election less often than other endorsed candidates.
8 These states were selected because the group of newspapers audited by ABC is more rep resentative of the total number o f newspapers than in other states. They represent around 30% of total newspapers in these eight states. For the remaining states, ABC's samp le represents around 20% of total newspapers. Representativeness is crucial to the analysis. Locations where ABC newspapers are not representative are more prone to have county electoral outcomes erroneously matched with a newspaper, and therefore with its last endorsement publication date.
Table 1
To help understand the type of selection across candidates, Table 2 presents results from a linear probability model that explains candidates' likelihood of receiving a Tuesday Endorsement. It includes controls for candidates' characteristics and as a proxy for competitiveness of the race, in which I consider indicators for winners' vote share from the previous election. In addition, all regressions include race-, state-, and year-fixed effects. As shown in Column 1, only the coefficient related to incumbency is statistically significant.
Incumbents are 11.78% less likely to receive a Tuesday Endorsement than others, and incumbency status is a strong predictor of candidate vote share and of the election winner (Jacobson, 2004 
Results
1 Tuesday Electoral Advantage
The Table 3 The regression results are reported in Snyder and Stromberg (2010) for all county-jurisdiction observations in the dataset. 13 As the authors explain, the variable measures the match between newspaper markets and political jurisdiction, and it has the appealing aspect of correlating with papers' coverage on politics. 14 I identified and created an indicator (high-) 11 The approach of exp loring within-candidate variation in endorsements, with the inclusion of candidate -fixed effects, is possible for gubernatorial races because these candidates receive four newspaper endorsements on average.
12 According to a National survey conducted by the Cable Television Advertisement Bureau in 2011, 60% of individuals decide their votes a week before the national election. This proportion is 75% for local elections.
13 I follow the definition in Snyder and Stromberg (2010, p. 361) . for county jurisdictions whose congruency value is above the average. Co lumn 5 shows the result for a baseline specification including high and its interaction with a Tuesday Endorsement. The coefficient related to this interaction is positive and statistically significant at the 10% level. It reveals a differential Tuesday Effect according to newspapers' political participation in a county-jurisdiction. The magnitude of this coefficient is close to γ in Column 1. Also, for specification in Column 5, the indicator for the Tuesday Endorsement is no longer statistically significant. This set of results suggests that most of the Tuesday Effect is driven by voters that live in high-congruency counties. These citizens are more likely to be regular newspaper readers, and appear to be more likely to trust a newspaper's political advice.
In addition to the Tuesday Endorsement, Table 3 Democratic candidate tends to be a more appealing candidate than a Republican candidate.)
However, this coefficient is not statistically significant.
2 Understanding the Tuesday Effect
A plausible explanation for the Tuesday Effect is that voters are less attentive to endorsements published before Election Day. Of note for most specifications in Table 3 is that Monday and Tuesday dummies are not individually or jointly statistically significant. This is also in line with the intuition that Election Day is a more salient and hence more influential day for media announcements. An alternative explanation relates to voters' opportunities to be exposed to endorsement information. As shown in Table 4 , Tuesday
Endorsements are republished more often. Focusing on the three days before the election, most of the newspapers that publish their endorsements on Election Day publish their recommendations more frequently (once or twice) than newspapers that do not (zero or once).
If readers retain endorsement information read before Election Day but randomly choose when to read the newspaper's editorial section, then candidates that have their endorsement republished more often are more likely to gain votes due to the endorsement.
Table 4
Column 1 in Table 5 presents results from regressions that include dummies that indicate the number of days that a candidate's endorsement was republished during the three days preceding the election. These indicators are not statistically significant, neither individually (p-value>0.67) nor jointly (p-value=0.84). In contrast, the coefficient γ is statistically significant at the 9% level. These findings indicate that the frequency of publication does not drive the Tuesday Effect or affect candidates' vote share.
To understand how voters use these last-minute recommendations, I present the results of interactions of Tuesday Endorsements with two candidate characteristics-incumbency and sharing the political orientation of the endorsing newspaper. The incumbency advantage in the United States is partly explained by name recognition (Jacobson, 1978 (Jacobson, , 1985 . Since voters are more familiar with these candidates, last-minute recommendations could reinforce readers' propensity to vote for them. However, the results do not support this hypothesis; incumbents do not gain more votes from Tuesday Endorsements than other candidates for other candidates endorsed on Election Day. This difference is observed by the interaction between the Tuesday Endorsement and an indicator for having the same political orientation as the endorsing newspaper. The related coefficient is statistically significant at the 7% level. Table 5 5. Discussion and Conclusion
Newspapers are important actors in American politics. They provide relevant information to citizens (Snyder and Stromberg 2010) , affecting their voting choices with political endorsements (Ladd and Lenz 2009; Chiang and Knight 2011) . These recommendations can be an easy shortcut for citizens, especially for voters who are still undecided when they reach Election Day. In this paper I argue that an endorsement published on Election Day is more influential because it provides salient information to voters. The alternative explanation to the Tuesday Advantage is that this correlation is determined by some unobservable heterogeneity across candidates and there is no Tuesday Effect.
The results show that a Tuesday Endorsement is associated with an increase in candidates'
vote share by between 1 and 2.2 percentage points. Although this impact seems unlikely to determine the election winner, the estimated effect is only a lower-bound number to the total effect of newspaper endorsements on vote outcomes. This is because I identify only the difference of vote counts amongst endorsed candidates. For example, I do not measure the possible effect of an endorsement last published on Monday with respect to receiving no endorsement.
Contrary to the idea that Tuesday Endorsements work as a name reminder, because voters are already familiar with incumbents I find that these candidates are no more likely to benefit from these recommendations than other candidates. Nonetheless, readers do not act as if they are blindly following newspapers' advice. They take into account the credibility of the newspaper and of its political recommendation. First, the Tuesday Advantage is only observed in high-congruency counties where citizens are accustomed to newspapers having an active say on local politics, and are familiar with their political advice. 15 Second, I find that voters take into account the ideology identity of both the endorsing newspaper and the endorsed candidate when evaluating the endorsement. As such, this finding is in line with predictions of models of media influence on uniformed rational voters (DellaVigna and Kaplan 2006; Calvert 1985) and with more recent predictions and findings presented by Chiang and Knight (2011) . Following this explanation, readers act as if they evaluate the endorsement credibility by taking into account or filtering newspapers' own ideological preferences when deciding on endorsements and assessing the (unobservable) quality of the recommended candidate.
In this paper I found that if a Democrat in a local race receives a Tuesday Endorsement from a right-wing newspaper his/her vote share is increased by 3.32% ( On the other hand, in terms of timely advice like last-minute political endorsements, voters behave with some sophistication and are aware of newspapers' political prejudice as they interpret and use the information. The evidence in this paper is perhaps even more surprising than that provided by Chiang and Knight (2011) since it is based on voters who behave as if they ignore previous media recommendations and decide on their votes on the day they cast their ballots. In general media bias is considered a problem in society, but this paper shows that it is not as bleak a situation as has been suggested. It can actually assist citizens in making better voting decisions. If partisan papers only make cross-ideological endorsements when there is a difference in quality among candidates (large enough to compensate for their ideological preferences) and readers recognize media bias, it will aid readers in selecting among various instances of media advice. This can thus help readers make voting choices, thereby granting votes to "better" candidates. Note: Number of publication days refers to the times that newspapers republish their endorsements in the three days preceeding the election. 
